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Abstract In Logik der Forschung (1934) and later works, Karl Popper proposed a set
of methodological rules for scientists. Among these were requirements that theories
evolve in the direction of increasing content, and that new theories should only be
accepted if some of their novel predictions are experimentally confirmed. There
are currently two, viable theories of cosmology: the standard cosmological model,
and a theory due to Mordehai Milgrom called MOND. Both theories can point to
successes and failures, but only MOND has repeatedly made novel predictions that
were subsequently found to be correct. Standard-model cosmologists, by contrast,
have almost always responded to new observations in a post-hoc manner, adjusting
or augmenting their theory as needed to obtain correspondence with the facts. I
argue that these methodological differences render a comparison of the two theories
in terms of their ‘truthlikeness’ or ‘verisimilitude’ essentially impossible since the
two groups of scientists achieve correspondence with the facts in often very different
ways, and I suggest that a better guide to the theories’ progress toward truth might
be the methodologies themselves.
Karl Popper, in his Realism and the Aim of Science (1983, p. 234), identified two
main attitudes with respect to the testing of scientific theories:
(a) The uncritical or verificationist attitude: one looks out for ‘verification’ or ‘confirmation’
or ‘instantiation’, and one finds it, as a rule. Every observed ‘instance’ of the theory is
thought to ‘confirm’ the theory.
(b) The critical attitude, or falsificationist attitude: one looks for falsification, or for counter-
instances. Only if the most conscientious search for counter-instances does not succeed may
we speak of a corroboration of the theory.
Attitude (b) is, of course, the attitude that Popper endorsed. A critical scientist denies
that scientific theories are verifiable. She asserts that theories are to be judged on
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the basis of how well they stand up to critical appraisal – to sincere attempts at
refutation.
In Popper’s view, accommodating a theory to known experimental or observa-
tional results does not corroborate the theory, since “it is always possible to produce
a theory to fit any given set of explicanda” (Popper 1963, pp. 241-2); or as Elie Zahar
(1973, p. 103) expressed it, “theories can always be cleverly engineered to yield
the known facts.” Corroboration occurs only when the theory survives an attempted
falsification: that is: when it predicts a previously unknown fact and that prediction
is subsequently confirmed. In the words of Imre Lakatos (1970, p. 38), “the only
relevant evidence is the evidence anticipated by a theory.”
There currently exist at least two, viable, cosmological theories: the standard, or
‘concordance,’ or ΛCDM, model; and an alternative theory, the foundational postu-
lates of which were published by Mordehai Milgrom in 1983. The standard model
assumes the correctness of Einstein’s theory of gravity and motion (or of Newton’s,
in the appropriate regimes) and deals with anomalies via postulates relating to ‘dark
matter’ and ‘dark energy,’ among others. Milgrom’s theory includes no dark matter
(or at least, does not require it). Observations that are explained in the standard
model by invoking dark matter are explained in Milgrom’s theory by postulating a
modification to Newton’s (or Einstein’s) laws of gravity and motion.
Both the standard model, and Milgrom’s theory – the latter is often called
‘MOND’, for MOdified Newtonian Dynamics’ – can point to successes and failures
(McGaugh 2015). But only Milgrom’s theory has repeatedly made novel predictions
that were subsequently found to be correct (Merritt 2020). Successes of the standard
model have been, almost without exception, successes of accommodation: the theory
has been adjusted, or augmented, or re-interpreted in order to bring its predictions1
in alignment with new observational facts, most of which constituted problems for
the theory when they first came to light. In many cases, those new facts were pre-
dicted in advance by Milgromian researchers; they were ‘unexpected’ only from the
standpoint of standard-model researchers.
Dark matter has never been detected in any experiment that a particle physicist
would consider decisive (Liu et al. 2017; Ko 2018; Kisslinger and Das 2019) and
in the absence of such a detection the existence of dark matter remains an uncon-
firmed hypothesis. But there is a related question that is capable of being decisively
answered: to which methodological ‘school’ do researchers in the two camps typ-
ically belong? The published record betrays a distinct, and profound, difference:
Milgromian researchers have adhered closely to Popper’s methodology, standard-
model cosmologists have not. I argue that these methodological differences render
pointless any discussion of the comparative ‘truthlikeness’ or ‘verisimilitude’ of the
theories since the two groups of scientists achieve correspondence with data in often
very different ways.
1 Throughout this chapter I use the term ‘prediction’ in the same way that Popper does, to describe
a statement that follows logically (deductively) from a theory (see e.g. item 28 in Table 1); it
comprises ‘retrodiction’ and ‘explanation’ (e.g. Popper (1957, p. 133)).
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The typical response of a scientist to a falsifying instance – an experiment or
observation that contradicts a theory – is not to discard the theory. Scientists are
more likely to retain the theory and ignore the counterexample (Kuhn 1962; Lakatos
1973). If the refutation is persistent or compelling, the scientist may decide to tack
an additional hypothesis onto the theory, one that targets the anomaly and ‘explains’
it. Ptolemy’s ‘equants’ came about in this way, as did the postulates in the standard
cosmological model about ‘dark matter’ and ‘dark energy’ (Merritt 2017).
Karl Popper’s name is most often associated with his famous demarcation crite-
rion: the idea that scientific hypotheses have the quality of being falsifiable, that is,
vulnerable to experimental testing. But Popper was quite aware that scientists do not
always walk away from a theory just because it has failed a test. In fact, he wrote at
length, and with considerable insight, about the methodology that scientists should
follow when modifying a theory in response to refutations.
Popper’smethodological guidelineswere intended to preserve falsifiability: “Only
with reference to the methods applied to a theoretical system is it at all possible
to decide whether we are dealing with a conventionalist or an empirical theory”
(1959, p. 82). He understood that, logically, falsification could always be evaded
by conventionalist maneuvers: by ad hoc changes that simply target the anomaly.
Thus Popper required that a modified theory should do more than simply explain the
experimental results that brought down the previous theory. The new theory should
have more content, and it should only be accepted if it passes some new tests, among
other requirements.
Many of Popper’smethodological rules appeared in 1934, inLogik der Forschung.
Others can be found scattered through later writings, including Conjectures and
Refutations (1963), Realism and the Aim of Science (1983), and The Open Society
and its Enemies (1945) among others. Jarvie (2001) lists fifteen rules; Keuth (2005)
finds twelve, only six of which appear in Jarvie’s list; and Johansson (1975) compiles
over twenty, including rules for the social sciences, the latter mostly from The Poverty
of Historicism (1957).
Table 1 presents a concatenation of these three lists. I have omitted the rules
pertaining to social science and to probability statements, and I include two additional
rules: no. 3 (from Popper 1959, p. 253) and no. 8 (from Popper 1963, p. 38).
The first rule in Table 1 was called by Popper (1959, p. 33) the “supreme rule,”
that is, “a rule of a higher type. It is the rule which says that the other rules of
scientific procedure must be designed in such a way that they do not protect any
statement in science against falsification”. (Keuth calls this the “meta-rule”.)
The second rule (“The game of science is, in principle, without end”) expresses
Popper’s commitment to fallibilism: the acknowledgement that we can never be
certain of the correctness of our theories, therefore we can never stop testing them.
Rules no. 3-6 enjoin the scientist to search for causal and universal laws as explana-
tions for observed events. As David Miller (1994, pp. 26-7) has emphasized, Popper
is not implying here any “metaphysical assumption concerning the immutability or
order of nature,” since such an assumption is amenable to testing andmay be found to
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Table 1 Popper’s Methodological Rules𝑎
# Rule Source
1 the other rules of scientific procedure must be designed in such a way that J [SR], K [MR]
they do not protect any statement in science against falsification
2 The game of science is, in principle, without end. He who decides one day J1, K1
that scientific statements do not call for any further test, and that they can be
regarded as finally verified, retires from the game.
3 it is part of our definition of natural laws if we postulate that they are to be M1
invariant with respect to space and time; and also if we postulate that they
are to have no exceptions
4 we are not to abandon the search for universal laws and for a coherent J3, K4
theoretical system, nor ever give up our attempts to explain causally any
kind of event we can describe
5 never . . . explain physical effects, i.e. reproducible regularities, as J12
accumulations of accidents
6 regard natural laws as synthetic and strictly universal statements 3i
7 only such statements may be introduced in science as are inter-subjectively 1i, K3
testable
8 criteria of refutation have to be laid down beforehand: it must be agreed M2
which observable situations, if actually observed, mean that the theory is
refuted
9 in the case of a threat to our system, we will not save it by any kind of K6
conventionalist stratagem
10 adopt a rule not to use undefined concepts as if they were implicitly defined 2i, J4
11 only those [auxiliary hypotheses] are acceptable whose introduction does 2ii, J5, K8
not diminish the degree of falsifiability or testability of the system in
question, but, on the contrary, increases it
12 we shall forbid surreptitious alterations of usage 2iii, J6, K9
13 Inter-subjectively testable experiments are either to be accepted, or to be 2iv, J7-8
rejected in the light of counter-experiments. The bare appeal to logical
derivations to be discovered in the future can be disregarded.
14 auxiliary hypotheses shall be used as sparingly as possible 2v
15 the number of our axioms – of our most fundamental hypotheses 3iii
– should be kept down
16 The new theory should proceed from some simple, new, and powerful, 3v
unifying idea about some connection or relation (such as gravitational
attraction) between hitherto unconnected things (such as planets and
apples) or facts (such as inertial and gravitational mass) or new ‘theoretical
entities’ (such as field and particles).
17 any new system of hypotheses should yield, or explain, the old, corroborated, 3iv
regularities
18 those theories should be given preference which can be most severely tested . . . 3ii, J11
equivalent to a rule favouring theories with the highest possible empirical content
𝑎 ‘2i’ indicates the i’th rule from group 2 of Johansson (1975) and similarly for J (= Jarvie 2001)
and K (= Keuth 2005); reference to the works by Popper in which the rules first appeared can be
found by consulting those authors. Rules no. 3 and 8, marked ‘M’, do not appear in any of the three
lists and references are given in the text.
be false. Rather he is proposing themethodological rule: search for spatio-temporally
invariant laws, even though the search may turn out to be unsuccessful.
MOND and Methodology 5
Table 1 Popper’s Methodological Rules (continued)
# Rule Source
19 we require that the new theory should be independently testable 3vi
20 We shall take it [the theory] as falsified only if we discover a reproducible 4i
effect which refutes the theory. In other words, we only accept the falsification
if a low-level empirical hypothesis which describes such an effect is
proposed and corroborated
21 we should not accept stray basic statements – i.e. logically disconnected 4ii, J10
ones – but . . . we should accept basic statements in the course of testing
theories; of raising searching questions about these theories, to be answered
by the acceptance of basic statements
22 a theory is to be accorded a positive degree of corroboration if it is 5i
compatible with the accepted basic statements and if, in addition, a non-
empty sub-class of these basic statements is [– – –] accepted as the results
of sincere attempts to refute the theory
23 it is not so much the number of corroborating instances which determines 5ii
the degree of corroboration as the severity of the various tests to which
the hypothesis in question can be, and has been, subjected
24 we shall not continue to accord a positive degree of corroboration to a 5iii, K12
theory which has been falsified by an inter-subjectively testable experiment
25 We require that the [new] theory should pass some new, and severe, tests. 5iv
26 We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other K10
theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to
survive. This will be the one which not only has hitherto stood up to the
severest tests, but the one which is also testable in the most rigorous way.
27 whenever we find that a system has been rescued by a conventionalist K7
stratagem, we shall test it afresh, and reject it, as circumstances may require
28 With the help of other statements, previously accepted, certain singular K5
statements – which we may call ‘predictions’ – are deduced from the [new]
theory; especially predictions that are easily testable or applicable. From
among these statements, those are selected which are not derivable from
the current theory, and more especially those which the current theory
contradicts.
29 a theory which has been well corroborated can only be superseded by one K11
of a higher level of universality; that is by a theory which is better testable
and which, in addition, contains the old, well corroborated theory – or
at least a good approximation to it.
30 Once a hypothesis has been proposed and tested, and has proved its mettle, J2, K2
it may not be allowed to drop out without ‘good reason’. A ‘good reason’
may be, for instance: replacement of the hypothesis by another which is
better testable; or the falsification of one of the consequences of the hypothesis.
31 after having produced some criticism of a rival theory, we should always J9
make a serious attempt to apply this or a similar criticism to our own theory
Rules no. 8-13 forbid conventionalist stratagems, that is, adjustments intended
to protect a theory from falsification. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper
highlighted four such “immunizing” techniques and rules nos. 10-13 target each
in turn. Jarvie (2001) separates rule no. 13 into two: admonishing scientists, when
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faced with a refutation, not to arbitrarily reject either an experimental result or the
theoretical derivation that conflicts with it.2
In addition to forbidding conventionalism, Popper proposed a number of other
rules that are relevant to theory change – that is: to a situation in which a theory
is modified in response to a refutation. Rules nos. 14-19, 25 and 26 together imply
the following: In explaining the observations that brought down a falsified theory,
a new theory should conserve the explanatory successes of the old theory (rule
no. 17); it should do so in a way that maximizes falsifiability/new content/boldness
(nos. 14-16, 18); and at least some of the modified theory’s novel content should be
experimentally corroborated (nos. 25, 26). Of course, as stated, rule no. 25 – that
“the theory should pass some new, and severe, tests” – is not quite a methodological
rule, since, as Lakatos (1968, p. 388) noted, “It is up to us to devise bold theories;
it is up to Nature whether to corroborate or to refute them.” But it is reasonable to
recast the rule as a methodological one, e.g., we accept a new theory only if it passes
some new, and severe, tests.
Most scientists would probably agree with Popper about the privileged status
of confirmed, novel predictions. For instance, Gottfried Leibniz wrote that “Those
hypotheses deserve the highest praise . . . by whose aid predictions can bemade, even
about phenomena or observations which have not been tested before” (Leibniz 1678).
Similar statements can be found in writings of John Herschel, William Whewell,
Henri Poincaré, Charles Peirce, Norbert Campbell and others. But Popper makes a
stronger claim. Not only is it impressivewhen a theory correctly predicts a previously
unknown fact. Popper is arguing that the confirmation of a novel prediction is the
only sort of evidence that counts.
What was the basis for this claim? The starting point is the fallacy of induction: the
logical impossibility of generalizing from discrete instances to a general rule. Even
an incorrect theory can make correct predictions, and one can always accommodate
a finite set of data to an infinite number of theories.
It is tempting to believe that a successful prediction always lends support to a
theory, but this belief flies in the face of the ‘paradoxes of confirmation’ (Hosiasson-
Lindenbaum1940; Hempel 1945). It is easy to show that, from a purely logical
standpoint, a universal hypothesis is supported by anything that does not contradict
it; the only sort of observation that fails to support a hypothesis is one that disproves
it. Thus: my observation of a red fire truck outside my window confirms the standard
model of cosmology precisely as much (or as little) as an observation of the cosmic
microwave background – so long as that model does not forbid the existence of
red fire trucks. As Popper (1983, p. 235) put it: “Thus an observed white swan
will, for the verificationist, support the theory that all swans are white; and if he
is consistent (like Hempel), then he will say that an observed black cormorant also
supports the theory that all swans are white.” The ‘paradoxes’ of confirmation are a
straightforward consequence of the fallacy of induction.
2 Both Johansson (1975) and Jarvie (2001) note that the wording of the first part of rule no. 13 is
confusing. Johansson (p. 58) suggests that Popper meant to write “Inter-subjectively testable theo-
ries”; Jarvie (p. 59) suggests that “What is plainly intended is a presumption that inter-subjectively
testable experimental work be accepted.” I find Jarvie’s suggestion to be the more convincing.
MOND and Methodology 7
Correspondence of data with theory, of itself, counts for little; one needs to find
a sharper criterion to separate the evidentialy relevant wheat from the chaff.
Popper’s ‘positive theory of corroboration’ (1959, pp. 265-73; 1983, pp. 230-61)
derives from three premises.3 From the paradox of confirmation it follows (as just
discussed) that it would be a mistake to consider an observation as supporting a
hypothesis simply because it is consistent with that hypothesis. The second premise
was Popper’s belief that, while degree of corroboration “may at first sight look like a
probability . . . [it] exhibits properties incompatible with the rules of the probability
calculus” (1983, p. 232). For instance, the testability of a theory, and therefore its
potential for corroboration, increases with its informative content, and therefore
with its improbability. And third was Popper’s insistence that a goal of science must
always be toward theories with greater informative content – that is: toward theories
of lower probability. Popper (1983, p. 222) argued that an inductivist (he singled out
Carnap) will always try to maximize the probability of a theory given the evidence
and so will always be led to theories that go as little as possible beyond the evidence.
Whereas scientists, he said, “invariably prefer a highly testable theory whose content
goes far beyond all observed evidence to an ad hoc hypothesis, designed to explain
just this evidence, and little beyond it, even though the latter must always be more
probable than the former” (Popper 1983, p. 256).
Popper (1972, p. 71) noted that “Knowledge never begins from nothing, but
always from some background knowledge.” He defined background knowledge, 𝐵,
as the set of assumptions that are accepted (perhaps only tentatively) when a new
hypothesis is tested, and argued that “what is interesting in a new conjecture 𝑎 is, in
the first instance, the relative content 𝑎, 𝐵; that is to say, that part of the content of 𝑎
which goes beyond 𝐵” (Popper 1972, p. 49).
Based on these arguments, Popper was led to reformulate the question ‘Does an
observation 𝐸 support a hypothesis 𝐻?’ as ‘Does 𝐸 support 𝐻 in the presence of
background knowledge 𝐵?’
Simply requiring that 𝐸 follow from the conjunction of 𝐻 and 𝐵 is insufficient,
since this condition may be satisfied if 𝐸 follows from 𝐵 alone. Nor is it enough to
demand that 𝐸 does not follow from 𝐵 alone. Popper gave as an example the failure
of James Challis to discovered Neptune, even though he was the first to observe
the planet near to its predicted location: “The presence of some unknown star of
eighth magnitude, close to the calculated place, was in itself quite probable on his
background knowledge and therefore did not appear significant to him” (Popper
1983, p. 237).
3 Philosophers who reject some or all of these premises will sometimes nevertheless embrace the
conclusions that Popper derived from them. For instance, Psillos (1999), who makes no secret of
his inductivist leanings, or of his admiration for Carnap, writes (p. 105 and 173) “we should not
accept a hypothesis merely on the basis that it entails the evidence, if that hypothesis is the product
of an ad hoc manoeuvre . . . The notion of empirical success that realists are happy with is such that
it includes the generation of novel predictions which are in principle testable.” Those sentences
could just as easily have been written by Popper (cf. rules no. 7, 9 and 19 from Table 1). Niiniluoto
(2018, p. 117) similarly suggests as an “acceptance rule” for an inductive inference that it “should
be independently testable, i.e. it should either explain some old evidence or be successful in serious
new tests . . . the best hypothesis is one with both explanatory and predictive power.”
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These considerations led Popper (1983, p. 239) to propose that evidence 𝐸 sup-
ports hypothesis 𝐻 given background knowledge 𝐵 if both:
1. 𝐸 follows from the conjunction of 𝐻 and 𝐵
2. 𝐸 is improbable on the background knowledge alone.
Popper noted that saying that 𝐸 is improbable based on 𝐵 alone is similar to saying
that 𝐻 is a bold hypothesis – that it makes claims that go far beyond the background
knowledge; and therefore that it has high empirical content. Elsewhere, Popper had
defined a “severe test” in essentially the same way. Thus Popper’s condition for
corroboration can be stated as: A theory is corroborated when it survives a severe
test: a concerted attempt at falsification.4 The more novel a test – the more unlikely
the prediction in the light of existing knowledge – the riskier it is, and the greater the
degree of corroboration if the prediction is confirmed.
§§
Subsequent authors – while not objecting to Popper’s basic reasoning – have
argued for different, or broader, definitions of what constitutes a ‘novel prediction’ or
evidential support. Elie Zahar (1973) noted that Popper’s criterion, which recognizes
only observations made after a theory was formulated, excludes some well-known
examples from history. For instance, the Balmer series of hydrogenwas known before
Bohr published his postulates in 1913; Kepler’s lawswere known toNewton; Einstein
knew of the anomalous precession of Mercury’s orbit. What matters, Zahar argued,
is not the chronology so much as whether a fact “belong[s] to the problem-situation
which governed the construction of the hypothesis” – i.e., whether the theory was
designed to explain the fact. On this view, a ‘novel fact’ is one that a theory was not
specifically designed to explain.
Of course, one does not always know what background knowledge was in the
mind of the theorist who designed the theory. But there is one – rather common –
circumstance in which it is obvious that background knowledge is being used in this
way. That is when the theory contains unspecified parameters, and the parameters are
determined from experimental or observational data. In Zahar’s (1973, pp. 102-3)
words:
Consider the following situation. We are given a set of facts and a theory T [_1, . . . , _𝑚 ]
which contains an appropriate number of parameters. Very often the parameters can be
adjusted so as to yield a theory T* which ‘explains’ the given facts . . . In such a case we
should certainly say that the facts provide little or no evidential support for the theory, since
the theory was specifically designed to deal with the facts.
Zahar is not claiming here that there is anything illegitimate about determining a
theory’s parameters from data. Rather, he is arguing that data that are used to set the
parameters of a theory do not corroborate the theory; they only complete the theory;
and in so doing they have lost their evidential value. John Worrall summarized this
4 Miller (1994, p. 106): “Sitting around complacently with a well-meant resolve to accept any
refutations that happen to arise is a caricature of genuine falsificationism.”
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conditionmore succinctly: “one can’t use the same fact twice: once in the construction
of a theory and then again in its support” (Worrall 1978, p. 48).5
In practice, the situation may not be quite as clear-cut as Zahar’s argument
suggests. There may be different data sets, or combinations of data sets, that a
theorist can use when determining a theory’s parameters and it may not be obvious
which data should be assigned to the ‘background knowledge’ and which data can be
considered evidentialy relevant. It is also possible that the data are not reproducible
for any choice of a theory’s parameters, and if so they would expose the theory to
potential falsification.6
But consider the following special case. Suppose that the theory contains just one
unspecified parameter and that its value is formally over-determined by the data: that
is, that there are a number of independent data sets from which the parameter can
be determined with comparable precision. In that case, whichever data set is chosen
to determine the parameter (it does not much matter which) becomes part of the
background knowledge; the newly-determined parameter can then be inserted into
the theory and the now-completed theory can be used to make predictions which
can be tested against the other data sets. Those tests are novel according to Zahar’s
criterion, and if they are successful, the successes constitute corroboration of the
underlying theory.
This is a good description of how Milgrom’s constant 𝑎0 – the only undeter-
mined parameter in his theory – is determined. Table 2 (adapted from Merritt 2020)
demonstrates that a number of independent data sets, targeting three predictions
of Milgrom’s theory, yield comparable, and comparably accurate, estimates of 𝑎0,
approximately 1.2 × 10−8 cm s−2. (In fact, as discussed in the next section, one can
determine 𝑎0 independently using any one of hundreds of existing galaxy rotation
curves, although with less precision.) Having determined 𝑎0 using any one of the
data sets in Table 2, a scientist can insert that value into Milgrom’s theory and
make quantitative predictions that are testable using any of the other data sets listed
there. As discussed in the next section, those predictions turn out to be success-
ful; and since Zahar’s criterion is satisfied for them, those successes can be said to
corroborate Milgrom’s theory.
5 Worrall (1985, p. 313) argues further “that when one theory has accounted for a set of facts by
parameter-adjustment, while a rival accounts for the same facts directly and without contrivance,
then the rival does, but the first does not, derive support from those facts.” Interpreted broadly,
Worrall’s argument would imply that no standard-model explanation of any fact correctly predicted
by Milgrom’s theory counts in favor of the standard model, since standard-model explanations of
such facts always invoke a multitude of adjustable parameters or auxiliary hypotheses not required
by Milgrom’s theory; some examples are discussed below.
6 An example occurred in studies of the cosmic microwave background (CMB), but the response of
standard-model cosmologists was simply to add more parameters. Early studies of the CMB (e.g.
Jaffe et al. 2001) assumed a value 𝑛 = 1 for the power-law index of the spectrum of initial density
perturbations, but as the amount and quality of data increased, this value 𝑛 began to be treated as
a free parameter (e.g. Netterfield 2002) and later as a ‘running index’ (e.g. Spergel et al. 2007). In
this way the model was “immunized” (Popper’s expression) from falsification. I am aware of only
one attempt to confront the CMB data with a testable prediction; the theory was Milgrom’s and the
prediction (McGaugh 1999) was confirmed (de Bernardis et al. 2002).
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Table 2 Determinations of Milgrom’s constant
Prediction Reference 𝑁galaxy 𝑎0 (10−10 m s−2)
Baryonic Tully-Fisher Relation Begeman et al. (1991) 10 1.21 ± 0.24
(𝑎0𝐺) Stark et al. (2009) 28 1.18
+ Trachternach et al. (2009) 34 1.30
McGaugh (2011) 47 1.24 ± 0.14
Lelli et al. (2016a) 118 1.29 ± 0.06
Central Surface Density Relation Donato et al. (2009) ∼ 103 1.3
(𝑎0/𝐺) Lelli et al. (2016b) 135 1.27 ± 0.05
Radial Acceleration Relation Wu and Kroupa (2015) 74 1.21 ± 0.03
(𝑎0/𝐺 → 𝑎0𝐺) McGaugh et al. (2016) 153 1.20 ± 0.02 ± 0.24
Lelli et al. (2017)
The philosopher John Losee (2004, p. 156; 2005, p. 166) uses the term ‘conver-
gence’ to describe cases like this: in which a new constant of nature is determined,
consistently, from a number of different kinds of data. Losee writes “I know of no
plausible countercase in which convergence of this kind is achieved in the case of a
transition judged not to be progressive on other grounds”:
The convergence of various determinations of the value of Avogadro’s number on 6.02×1023
molecules/ gram molecular weight warrants as progressive the transition from theories of
the macroscopic domain to the atomic-molecular theory of its microstructure. And the
convergence of various determinations of the value of Planck’s constant on 6.6 × 10−27
erg-sec warrants the transition from classical electromagnetic theory to the theory of the
quantization of energy (Losee 2004, pp. 156-7).
Losee (who was unaware, apparently, of Milgrom’s theory) adds “Unfortunately,
opportunities to apply the convergence condition are rare within the history of
science.”
Does the standard cosmological model provide any opportunities for testing con-
vergence? Indeed it does: the mean baryon7 density, 𝜌𝑏 , is a parameter that can be
measured in a number of independent ways. It is traditional to express this quantity






7 Standard-model cosmologists often use ‘baryonic matter’ to mean ‘normal [i.e. non-dark] matter’.
Milgromian researchers sometimes follow suit, even though, from their perspective, there is no
need to distinguish between two sorts of matter.
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with 𝐻 the Hubble (expansion) parameter. The concordance value of Ω𝑏ℎ2 is said
to be 0.022 where ℎ ≡ 𝐻0/100 km s−2. Prior to observations of the CMB in the
early 2000s, the value of 𝜌𝑏 was determined from two, quite different sorts of data:
(i) the measured abundance of 7Li in the atmospheres of Population II stars in the
halo of the Milky Way, together with the equations of big-bang nucleosynthesis;
and (ii) direct census of the density of matter in the local universe. Both techniques
yielded (and continue to yield) 0.011 . Ω𝑏ℎ2 . 0.016 –consistent with each other,
and roughly one-half of the current concordance value. Since about 2002, standard-
model cosmologists have excluded these two data sets when determining the values
of the parameters that define their ‘concordance’ model; the resulting discrepancies
in the value of 𝜌𝑏 are called by them the ‘lithium problem’ (e.g. Fields 2011) and
the ‘missing baryons problem’ (e.g. Shull et al. 2012). Thus, the evolution of the
standard cosmological model beginning around 2002 violated rules no. 17 and 29
in Table 1: it failed to conserve “the old, corroborated, regularities” of the model,
namely, the convergence of measured values of 𝜌𝑏 .
Neither the ‘lithium problem’ nor the ‘missing baryons problem’ exists from the
standpoint of a Milgromian researcher, who is likely to prefer the value of 𝜌𝑏 that
was established prior to 2000.
§§
Milgrom’s theory is a response to an anomaly that arose in the 1970s in obser-
vations of disk galaxies. The speed, 𝑉 , at which stars or gas clouds orbit at distance
𝑅 about the galaxy center is predictable using Newton’s laws of gravity and motion
given the observed distribution of mass (‘baryons’) in the galaxy. The Newtonian
prediction is often found to be reasonably correct near the centers of galaxies, i.e.
𝑉obs (𝑅) ≈ 𝑉Newton (𝑅). But at sufficiently large 𝑅, rotation curves become ‘asympto-
tially flat’: the orbital speed tends to a constant value (different in different galaxies),
𝑉obs (𝑅) → 𝑉∞  𝑉Newton.
In his first paper from 1983, Milgrom proposed a modification to Newton’s laws
of gravity and motion that targets, and explains, the asymptotic flatness of galaxy
rotation curves. Milgrom’s auxiliary hypothesis was presented in the form of three
postulates, which were re-stated, in slightly different form, in two subsequent papers
from the same year. For the sake of definiteness I will take the liberty of (re-)stating
Milgrom’s postulates as follows:
1. Newton’s second law relating acceleration to gravitational force is asymptoti-
cally correct when applied to motion for which the gravitational acceleration is
sufficiently large, but breaks down when the acceleration is sufficiently small.
2. In the limit of small gravitational accelerations, the acceleration of a test particle,
in a symmetric and stationary gravitating system, is given by (𝑎/𝑎0) 𝒂 ≈ 𝒈N,
where 𝒈N is the conventional gravitational acceleration and 𝑎0 (‘Milgrom’s con-
stant’) is a constant with the dimensions of acceleration.
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3. The transition from the Newtonian regime to the low acceleration regime is
determined by Milgrom’s constant. The transition occurs within a range of accel-
erations of order 𝑎0 around 𝑎0.
Sufficiently far from the center of a galaxy, the Newtonian gravitational acceleration
has magnitude
𝒈N ≈ 𝐺𝑀gal/𝑟2, with 𝑀gal the total mass of the galaxy and 𝑟 the







Equating this expression with the centripetal acceleration of a test mass moving in a













so that 𝑉 is independent of 𝑅.
As Milgrom pointed out in the same three papers from 1983, his postulates can
be used to generate additional, testable predictions. As we will see, most or all of
these predictions have been observationally confirmed. But before discussing those
results we can pause and take stock of how well Milgrom’s proposed changes to
Newton’s laws accord with Popper’s methodological rules:
Rules no. 7, 11 and 19, which require that theory modifications be testable and
that they result in increased empirical content, are (as just noted) clearly satisfied.
Rule no. 8 (“criteria of refutation have to be laid down beforehand”) is also clearly
satisfied: it is obvious from Milgrom’s 1983 papers that he viewed his predictions
as having the potential to falsify the underlying theory.
Rules no. 14 and 15, which counsel parsimony when adding axioms (three in this
case), are arguably satisfied, as is rule no. 16 (“should proceed from some simple,
new, and powerful” idea): a proposal that Newton’s laws are incorrect is nothing
if not “new, and powerful.” And Milgrom’s auxiliary hypotheses clearly preserve
“old, corroborated, regularities” (rule no. 17): both in the high-acceleration regime
(𝑎  𝑎0) since the modified theory makes the same prediction as Newton’s laws;
and also in the low-acceleration regime, since the only “regularity” that was known
to exist in this regime ca. 1980 was the asymptotic flatness of rotation curves. (In
other words: no ‘Kuhn losses’ here.) None of the other rules 1-24 (to the extent that
they are applicable) is violated.
This brings us to rule no. 25, which demands that the modified theory “should
pass some new, and severe, tests” – in other words, that (at least some of) its novel
predictions should be experimentally corroborated. And here, Milgrom’s modified
dynamics has performed not just adequately, but – by any reasonable standard –
spectacularly. Here is a partial list of corroborated novel predictions:
1. A universal relation between asymptotic speed and total mass of a disk galaxy
2. A universal relation between the acceleration 𝒂 at any point in a disk galaxy and
the Newtonian gravitational acceleration 𝒈N due to the galaxy’s mass
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3. A universal relation between the central surface densities of normal and ‘dark’
matter in galaxies
4. A predicted dependence of the rms, vertical velocity of stars on distance above
or below the plane of the Milky Way galaxy
5. A relation between the mass of a gravitating system and the root-mean-square


















































Fig. 1 Two confirmed, novel predictions of Milgrom’s theory. Left: The baryonic Tully-Fisher
relation (BTFR). Each point corresponds to a single disk galaxy. The vertical axis (Mb) is the
summed mass in stars and gas (the subscript ‘b’ stands for ‘baryonic,’ i.e., ‘non-dark’). The
horizontal axis (Vf) is the outer, flat rotation velocity as inferred from 21 cm radio telescopic
observations, what is called here ‘𝑉∞’. Figure reprinted with permission from B. Famaey and
S. S. McGaugh, “Modified Newtonian dynamics (MOND): observational phenomenology and
relativistic extensions,” Living Reviews in Relativity, 15, 2012, p. 20. Right: The radial acceleration
relation (RAR), derived from rotation curve data of 153 galaxies. The vertical axis plots the observed
acceleration, 𝑔obs = 𝑉 2/𝑟 , or what is called 𝑎 in the text. The horizontal axis plots 𝑔bar = |𝜕Φ/𝜕𝑟 |,
or what is called 𝑔N in the text. Figure reprinted with permission from S. S. McGaugh, F. Lelli, and
J. M. Schombert, “Radial acceleration relation in rotationally supported galaxies,” Physical Review
Letters, 117, p. 201101, 2016. Copyright (2016) by the American Physical Society.
Prediction no. 1 is just Eq. (3). The observed relation between galaxy mass and
asymptotic rotation speed (Fig. 1a) is nowadays called the ‘baryonic Tully-Fisher
relation’ or BTFR.8 The predicted relation contains (like essentially all predictions
8 That rather baroque name is due to standard-model cosmologists; see e.g. Merritt (2020, Chapter
4) for the relevant history. Milgrom refers to his predicted relation by the much more apt name
‘mass–asymptotic speed relation.’
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fromMilgrom’s theory) the unspecified constant 𝑎0, ‘Milgrom’s constant.’ As noted
earlier (cf. Table 2 and the accompanying discussion), there are many ways to deter-
mine 𝑎0 from data but most astrophysicists consider the BTFR to be the ‘cleanest,’
that is, least subject to systematic errors. The novelty of Milgrom’s prediction can
perhaps best be attested by the fact that no standard-model cosmologist had proposed
(or, it appears, searched for) any such relation prior to 1983 – no doubt in large part
because, under the standard model, the asymptotic velocity is attributable almost
entirely to the dark matter, not the ‘baryons.’
Prediction no. 2 is probably the most remarkable, at least from the standpoint of
standard-model expectations.Milgrom (1983a) showed that the local acceleration 𝑎 –
accessible, in any disk galaxy, through𝑉2 (𝑅)/𝑅 –must be related to the gravitational
acceleration 𝑔N computed from the observed mass distribution under Newtonian
gravity via a relation 𝑎 = 𝑓 (𝑔N/𝑎0)𝑔N with 𝑓 (𝑥) some as yet unspecified function
of 𝑥 ≡ 𝑔N/𝑎0. (Of course, in the purely Newtonian case, 𝑓 ≡ 1.) Regardless of
the functional form of 𝑓 , Milgrom’s prediction was therefore that the acceleration
will be a universal function of the Newtonian prediction, hence of the baryonic
mass distribution, with 𝑎0 as the only unspecified parameter. As noted by Milgrom
(2016), this prediction can be expressed in a number of essentially equivalent ways:
as a relation between 𝑎 and 𝑔N, between 𝑎 and 𝑎/𝑔N, between 𝑔N and 𝑎/𝑔N etc.
And in fact, observational corroboration of the prediction exists in three forms:
individual rotation curves; the ‘mass discrepancy-acceleration relation’ (MDAR), i.
e. the relation between 𝑎 ≡ 𝑉2/𝑅 and 𝑎/𝑔N; and the ‘radial-acceleration relation’
(RAR), the relation between 𝑎 and 𝑔N (shown in Fig. 1b).
Given data like those in Fig. 1b, one can simply ‘read off’ (modulo measurement
uncertainties) the functional form of the relation between 𝑎 and 𝑔N. The latter is
sometimes called the ‘transition function.’ Various ad hoc, analytic forms have been
proposed for the transition function; the curve plotted in Fig. 1b has a form first







, 𝑦 ≡ 𝑎
𝑔N
. (4)
Note the remarkable fact that Eq. (4) (to the extent that it is accurate) then allows one
to predict the acceleration experienced by a test body orbiting anywhere in a galactic
disk – not just in the ‘asymptotic’ regimes of high or low acceleration Thus, for
instance, one can predict the rotation curve 𝑉 (𝑅) for any single disk galaxy having
a well-determined mass distribution and there are dozens of published examples of
this kind (Milgrom 1988 being one of the earliest). Perhaps the most striking of these
studies (e.g. de Blok and McGaugh 1997) are based on galaxies which a standard-
model cosmologist would claim are ‘dark matter dominated’ everywhere – that is:
for which the observed rotation speed greatly exceeds the Newtonian prediction at
all positions. A standard-model cosmologist would predict that the rotation curve
of such a galaxy is essentially independent of the (non-dark) matter distribution,
and yet one finds, in every case, that the rotation curve is correctly predicted by the
modified dynamics using only the observed density in stars and gas.
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Given the background knowledge that existed ca. 1980, the proposal that the
kinematics of any disk galaxy could be predicted, with high accuracy, from the
observed distribution of normal matter alone was amazingly bold. There was simply
no basis, under the standard model, for believing any such thing, and yet it turned
out to be correct.
The remaining predictions no. 3-5 and their observational corroboration are dis-
cussed in detail in Merritt (2020).
A number of Popper’s remaining methodological rules 26-31 are expressed with
reference to the competing theory, to which I now turn. In what follows I will restrict
the discussion to predictions that follow from the non-relativistic versions of both
theories; see Merritt (2020) for a discussion of the relativistic theories.
§§
Standard-model cosmologists deal with the rotation curve anomaly by leaving
Newton’s laws intact and adding an auxiliary hypothesis:9
SCM1 In any galaxy or galactic system for which the observed motions are incon-
sistent with the predictions of Newton, the discrepancy is due to gravita-
tional forces from dark matter in and around the galaxy(ies).
This auxiliary hypothesis has far less informative content – that is, it is far less
testable – than Milgrom’s. As we have seen, Milgrom’s hypothesis allows one to
predict the rotation curve of a disk galaxy given measurements of the density of
the disk. That prediction is easily testable using the observed motions of stars or
gas clouds in the disk, and this is true for any of the (hundreds or thousands) of
well-observed disk galaxies.
The standard-model hypothesis SCM1 makes no prediction about the behavior of
observablematter. It only says something about the darkmatter. An observed rotation
curve can not be used to test hypothesis SCM1; rather, that hypothesis instructs the
scientist to use the measured 𝑉 (𝑅) (together with the observed density of stars and
gas in the disk) to predict the dark matter distribution. The rotation curve is treated
as part of the background knowledge. In Milgrom’s (1989, p. 216) words, postulate
SCM1 “simply states that dark matter is present in whatever quantities and space
distribution is needed to explain away whichever mass discrepancy arises.”Worrall’s
rule: “One can’t use the same fact twice: once in the construction of a theory and
then again in its support” tells us that the rotation curve, by virtue of having been
used in the construction of the dark matter distribution, has lost its ability to provide
support to the dark matter hypothesis.
This lack of testability extends to cases in which a galaxy’s rotation curve is
supplemented by other kinds of kinematical data. One much-discussed example is
9 Few cosmology textbooks acknowledge that the existence of dark matter is a postulate. Standard-
model cosmologists take it for granted, apparently, that the existence of dark matter has been
verified by rotation curve studies; e. g. Schneider (2015, p. 77): “The rotation curves of spiral
galaxies are flat up to the maximum radius at which they can be measured; spiral galaxies contain
dark matter” (italics his). Milgrom deserves credit for emphasizing that the existence of ‘dark
matter’ is a postulate of the standard model and not a confirmed fact.
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the so-called ‘Oort problem’: understanding what the observed distribution of stellar
velocities perpendicular to the Milky Way disk (at the Solar circle) implies about
the local mass density in the disk. Milgrom’s theory makes a solid prediction (this
is prediction no. 4 in the list of the previous section) and that prediction has been
confirmed: that is, the vertical motions are observed to be consistent, under the
modified dynamics, with the observed (‘baryonic’) mass in the disk (Nipoti et al.
2007; Bienaymé et al. 2009).
Under the standard model, one could imagine using SCM1, together with the ob-
served Milky Way rotation curve, to estimate the dark matter density near the Sun;
then test whether the vertical force generated by the total local density (‘baryonic’
plus dark) correctly predicts the observed vertical motions. But standard-model cos-
mologists have never succeeded in doing this. In the first such studies, John Bahcall
(1984b; 1984a) assumed a spherical dark ‘halo’ having a mass distribution designed
to explain the Galaxy’s rotation curve. That model made a definite prediction about
the local dark matter density, as well as its dependence on distance above or below
the disk. But Bahcall recognized the degeneracy of the dark matter models:
Since we haven’t yet observed the unseen material, we don’t know how it is distributed.
Therefore we have to try different models for the unseen material to see how the results
depend upon our assumptions (Bahcall, 1987, p. 19).
And indeed he treated the local dark matter density and its dependence on 𝑧 as
adjustable quantities.10 Subsequent studies of the Oort problem by standard-model
cosmologists have likewise shied away from casting their analyses as tests. For
instance, Smith et al. (2012) write (italics added):
If we assume our background mass represents the dark halo, it corresponds to a local dark
matter density of 0.57 GeV cm−3, which is noticeably larger than the canonical value of 0.30
GeV cm−3 typically assumed . . . As pointed out by various authors . . . , the local dark matter
density is uncertain by a factor of at least two. Our analysis adds still more weight to the
argument that the local halo density may be substantially underestimated by the canonical
value of 0.30 GeV cm−3 (Smith et al. 2012, p. 11).11
The local value of 𝜌DM – the prediction that could be refuted via an analysis of the
vertical motions – is typically decoupled from the rotation curve constraint in these
studies by allowing the dark matter halo to be nonspherical (e.g. Garbari et al. 2012;
Bienaymé et al. 2014). By treating the halo axis ratio as an extra, freely adjustable
parameter, many values of the local dark matter density can be made consistent with
a given rotation curve, thus effectively nullifying any predictive power of SCM1.
(This degeneracy adds to the “factor of at least two” uncertainty mentioned in the
quotation from Smith et al.) And indeed some studies are forced to assume extremely
contrived shapes for the darkmatter halo in order to get the vertical kinematics ‘right’
(Read 2014).
10 Although Bahcall never claimed to be testing a standard-model prediction, he did note (Bahcall
1987) that the data were explainable via Milgrom’s theory.
11 0.30 GeV cm−3 ≈ 0.008𝑀 pc−3.
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Oneway tomake a testable prediction of the standard-model postulate is to couple
SCM1 with some other hypothesis. In fact, standard-model cosmologists routinely
assume, in addition to SCM1, that
SCM2 The dark matter of SCM1 is composed of elementary particles.
(E.g. Funk (2015, p. 12264): “Today, it is widely accepted that dark matter exists and
that it is very likely composed of elementary particles, which are weakly interacting
and massive.”) One novel prediction immediately follows: some of the dark particles
associated with the Milky Way must be passing at every moment through an Earth-
based laboratory and could be detected, through their interaction with normal matter.
But this prediction – while capable of being confirmed – is not refutable, since
nothingwhatsoever is known about the properties of the putative particles (aside from
the fact that no known particles have properties that would make them acceptable
candidates). A failure to detect the particles might simply mean that their cross-
section for interaction with the normal matter in the detectors is very small, and that
is in fact one explanation that particle physicists propose for their almost four-decade
failure to detect a signal (Bertone and Hooper 2018).12
In this respect, the particle dark matter hypothesis is in a state similar to that of
the atomistic hypothesis at the end of the 19th century. Popper (1983, p. 191) noted
that the hypothesis that atoms exist was, for a long time, too vague to be refuted:
Failure to detect the corpuscles, or any evidence of them, could always be explained by
pointing out that they were too small to be detected. Only with a theory that led to an
estimate of the size of the molecules was this line of escape more or less blocked, so that
refutation became in principle possible.
Popper’s statement is perfectly applicable to the (particle) dark matter hypothesis
if one replaces ‘size of the molecules’ by ‘cross section of interaction of the dark
particles with normal matter.’
We are now in a position to assess how well postulates SCM1 and SCM2 accord
with Popper’s methodological rules. Rules no. 7, 11 and 19 are violated: as we have
seen, the postulates have little if any testable, that is, refutable, content. Rule no. 25,
which demands that the modified theory “should pass some new, and severe, tests,”
is not (yet) satisfied. And I would argue that rules no. 8 (“criteria of refutation have
to be laid down beforehand) and no. 9 (“in the case of a threat to our system, we
will not save it by any kind of conventionalist stratagem”) are also violated. Indeed a
pervasive feature of the standard-model literature is the conviction that any anomaly
12 When Elena Aprile was asked to estimate a cost for her XENONnT dark matter experiment at
the Italian Gran Sasso National Laboratory, the New York Times reports that she “was reluctant to
put a price on the project. An earlier version of the experiment with 3.3 tons of xenon cost $30
million. But that didn’t include the people, she said. A big part of the cost is xenon itself, which
costs around $2 million per ton, she added. Her new detector will have 8.5 tons” (Overbye 2020).
There are about a half-dozen such experiments currently underway (as reviewed by Kisslinger and
Das 2019). Given that the hypothesis being tested by the direct-detection experiments (that dark
particles are passing through the laboratory) is not refutable, it is reasonable to ask what will have
been accomplished by those experiments assuming the continued absence of a detection.
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will, eventually, be explainable within the paradigm.13 This attitude often conflicts
with rule no. 13 as well, which forbids the appeal to “derivations to be discovered in
the future.”
It is fair to say that rules no. 14 and15 are satisfied since the number of additional
axioms (two in this case) is small.14 But I would insist that rule no. 16 (“should
proceed from some simple, new, and powerful” idea) is violated. Here is one way
to justify that statement: When teaching introductory astrophysics, a problem that is
commonly set to students (who have not yet learned about dark matter) is to ask them
what can be inferred from the asymptotic flatness of rotation curves. The ‘correct’
answer, the answer that students are expected to find, is: there must be non-luminous
matter in or around the galactic disk. Far from being a “new, and powerful” idea,
dark matter is almost literally the first explanation that pops into anyone’s head.
Finally, rule no. 26 recommends, when deciding between two theories, to choose
the theory that is “testable in the most rigorous way.” That recommendation would
clearly favor Milgrom’s theory over the standard model, at least in terms of their
postulates that target the rotation curve anomaly.
§§
Rule no. 7 (Popper 1959, p. 56) states
only such statementsmay be introduced in science as are inter-subjectively testable
and rule no. 24 (Popper 1959, p. 268) is
we shall not continue to accord a positive degree of corroboration to a theory
which has been falsified by an inter-subjectively testable experiment.
Of course, as Popper acknowledged, and as others (Kuhn, Lakatos, Feryerabend)
also emphasized, a falsifying instance – even an inter-subjectively accepted one –
need not signal the ultimate death of a theory; indeed many of the rules in Table 1 are
guidelines for the scientist seeking tomodify her theory in response to a falsification.
But a theory that is not testable is not falsifiable. Nevertheless, standard-model
cosmologists do acknowledge that their theory is inconsistent with a number of
well-established facts. Silk and Mamon (2012) list seventeen such inconsistencies;
13 A striking example is the standard-model response to the remarkably correlated distribution
of satellite galaxies around the Milky Way and the Andromeda galaxy, observations that have
no, even remotely, plausible explanation under that model. Kroupa (2016, p. 557) documents the
variety of ‘conventionalist stratagems’ adopted by standard-model cosmologists in response to
those observations and concludes, “The [standard-model] community appears to have developed
an unhealthy sense of simply ignoring or burying previously obtained results if these are highly
inconsistent with the standardmodel of cosmology.”WhileMONDdoes not make a clear prediction
here, the observed correlations do not constitute a prima facie problem for Milgrom’s theory
(Pawlowski 2018).
14 On the other hand, one could reasonably take the point of view that postulate SCM1 comprises a
very large number of independent postulates, since the specification of the dark matter distribution
around any single galaxy requires a 3d function, and furthermore a function that is different for
every galaxy.
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Bullock and Boylan-Kolchin (2017) list about a dozen; and Kroupa (2012) gives
twenty-two. Which, if any, of these instances constitute falsifications in the sense
that Popper used that term?
I would argue that there have been only two important instances (since the
1960s) where the standard cosmological model has made predictions that were
inter-subjectively testable; and that in both cases, the predictions were subsequently
contradicted by observations.
The first instance pre-dated the dark matter postulates: it was the demonstration
that galaxy rotation curves are not correctly predicted by Newton’s theory (Rubin et
al. 1978; Bosma 1981).
The second occurred twenty years later: the discovery that the cosmological
expansion is accelerating rather than decelerating, as Einstein’s equations generically
predict (Riess et al. 1998; Perlmutter et al. 1999).15
One feature that sets these two failures of prediction apart is the way the standard-
model community chose to respond to them. In both cases, a (nearly) immediate
and (nearly) unanimous consensus was reached that an auxiliary hypothesis should
be added to the theory: ‘dark matter’ (that is, SCM1) in the first case, ‘dark energy’
in the second (Longair 2006). These two hypotheses were designed to maintain the
integrity of Einstein’s (or Newton’s) theory of gravity in the face of falsifying data,
and indeed the assumed properties of both dark matter and dark energy have been
revised a number of times, as needed to maintain that integrity as new data emerged
(Wang 2010; Majumdar 2015). Following Lakatos (1978), we can therefore identify
Einstein’s (Newton’s) theory of gravity as constituting part of the ‘hard core’ of the
standard cosmological ‘research program,’ and the postulates relating to dark matter
and dark energy as part of the ‘protective belt’ of auxiliary hypotheses that serve to
maintain the integrity of that hard core in the face of refutations.
By contrast, almost all of the other standard-model problems listed by Silk &
Mamon, Bullock & Boylan-Kolchin and Kroupa are failures of accommodation, not
of prediction.
What I mean by “accommodation” is best illustrated by an example. Consider
disk galaxy rotation curves. As noted above, dark matter postulate SCM1 makes no
prediction about rotation curves, nor have standard-model cosmologists yet come
up with any scheme that allows them to predict the rotation curve of any galaxy.
However, standard-model theorists have devoted enormous effort to ‘getting rotation
curves right’: that is: to finding ways to simulate the formation and evolution of
galaxies starting from early times, such that the statistical properties of the simulated
galaxies match (in some specified sense) the statistical properties of real galaxies –
“properties” here defined, of course, in terms of the observable matter (stars, gas).
When a standard-model cosmologist says that he has failed to predict the rotation
curves of (say) dwarf galaxies, what he means is that he has not been able to find a
physically reasonable set of simulation parameters that results in simulated galaxies
whose structure and kinematics ‘look’, in some average sense, like those of observed
dwarf galaxies.
15 Interestingly, both of these instances can be seen as failed tests of Einstein’s theory in the
low-acceleration regime.
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FromaMilgromian perspective, these standard-model failures reflect the difficulty
of getting the dark matter in the simulations to behave ‘correctly’ – to distribute itself
around every galaxy so that its stars and gas respond to the total gravitational force in
a manner that mimics the modified dynamics. Standard-model theorists, by contrast,
consider the behavior of the dark matter in their simulations to be unproblematic; the
problem, as seen by them, is to get those pesky baryons to behave. (E. g. Bullock and
Boylan-Kolchin (2017, p. 380): “Within the standardΛCDMmodel, most properties
of small-scale structure can be modeled with high precision in the limit that baryonic
physics is unimportant.” “Small-scale” here refers to single galaxies.)
Nowhere are the standard-model failures of accommodation more striking than in
the case of dwarf galaxies, which (they would say) are ‘dark-matter dominated’: that
is: fully in the Milgromian regime. And it is the dwarf galaxy literature that provides
some of the starkest illustrations of just how far standard-model cosmologists have
strayed frommethodological rule no. 7, that “only such statements may be introduced
in science as are inter-subjectively testable”:
Standard-model cosmologists identify the retinue of observed dwarf galaxies or-
biting the Milky Way with the dark matter ‘sub-halos’ that form in their simulations.
A problem immediately arises: the number of sub-halos in the simulations far ex-
ceeds the number of observed satellite galaxies (e.g. Silk and Mamon (2012, 939):
“The excessive predicted numbers of dwarf galaxies are [sic] one of the most cited
problems with ΛCDM. The discrepancy amounts to two orders of magnitude.”)
This discrepancy is called by standard-model cosmologists the ‘missing-satellites
problem,’16 and most attempts to solve it invoke some mechanism for heating or
removing gas from the sub-halos before the epoch of star formation. No single mech-
anism ‘works’ across the full spectrum of dwarf galaxy (that is, sub-halo) masses,
and standard-model cosmologists blithely invoke different mechanisms, as the need
arises, to explain the data on different mass scales. For instance, Bullock (2010, p.
12), after listing the various mechanisms that have been proposed for suppressing
star formation in the sub-halos, remarks:
each imposes a different mass scale of relevance . . . If, for example, we found evidence for
very low-mass dwarf galaxies 𝑉max ∼ 5 km s−1 then these [galaxies] would be excellent
candidates for primordial 𝐻2 cooling ‘fossils’ of reionization in the halo.
And Bullock and Boylan-Kolchin (2017, 370) write that “while many independent
groups are now obtaining similar results in cosmological simulations of dwarf galax-
ies . . . this is not an ab initio ΛCDM prediction, and it depends on various adopted
parameters in galaxy formation modeling.”
As Karl Popper (1983, p. 168) remarked in his critique of Freud’s theory, “every
conceivable case will become a verifying instance” (italics his).
16 Terminology like this should be of interest to social epistemologists: it suggests that standard-
model cosmologists, when conceptualizing the physical world, privilege their simulations over
the actual data. The name that Milgromian researchers attach to this standard-model failure is the
‘dwarf over-prediction problem.’Milgromian researchers postulate a different origin for the satellite
galaxies – see Kroupa (2012) – and the small number of satellites observed around the Milky Way
constitutes no problem for them.
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§§
Rules no. 11, 18, 19, 25, 26 and 29 direct the scientist to prefer theories with
greater explanatory power, content, or testability. Popper considered these qualities
to be closely linked, and in Conjectures and Refutations (p. 217) he called the
requirement that theories evolve in the direction of increasing content the criterion
of “potential satisfactoriness” or “potential progress”. He defined a criterion of
actual scientific progress in terms of rules no. 25 and 26: that is: the requirement
that at least some of a theory’s new content be experimentally confirmed (p. 220).
As is well known, Lakatos (1978) followed Popper’s lead in defining the “empirical
progressivity” of an evolving theory in terms of corroborated excess content – that
is: confirmed, novel predictions.
Popper (1962) sought to strengthen his intuitive idea of progress by defining the
“verisimilitude” or “truthlikeness” of a theory, a measure of the theory’s closeness
to truth. Given some definition of verisimilitude, and some scheme for evaluating it,
progress could be identified with an increase in a theory’s verisimilitude. But Popper
did not view verisimilitude as a concept that should necessarily take the place of, or
transcend, methodological considerations:
I do not suggest that the explicit introduction of the idea of verisimilitude will lead to any
changes in the theory of method. On the contrary, I think that my theory of testability
or corroboration by empirical tests is the proper methodological counterpart to this new
metalogical idea. The only improvement is one of clarification (Popper 1963, p. 235).
(In Watkins’s (1978, p. 365) words: “Popper got along well enough without the
idea of verisimilitude for a quarter century after 1934.”) Nevertheless Popper’s
“new metalogical idea” has been enthusiastically taken up by a generation of realist
philosophers, including Oddie (1986), Niiniluoto (1987), Kieseppä (1996), Kuipers
(2000), Zwart (2011) and others.
In view of this impressive body of work, it is natural to ask whether it is now
feasible to compare the two theories of cosmology in terms of their verisimilitude. I
will argue that the answer is ‘no’ and furthermore that the prospects for doing so in
the future are bleak.
My first point has to do with the way that scientific theories (includingMilgrom’s)
typically evolve. As Feyerabend (2010, p. 157) noticed,
Theories which effect the overthrow of a comprehensive and well-entrenched point of view.
. . are initially restricted to a fairly narrow domain of facts, to a series of paradigmatic
phenomena which lend them support, and they are only slowly extended to other areas.
Milgrom’s theory in its current state is marvelously successful at making novel
predictions for galaxies and groups of galaxies, and it has also had some notable
successes in anticipating large-scale data (Merritt 2020, chapter 6). But there is gen-
eral agreement even among Milgromian theorists that a suitable, general relativistic
version of the theory (or its equivalent) is not yet available; in the language of Imre
Lakatos, the Milgromian research program is in an earlier stage of development than
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the standard cosmological research program.17 And so comparisons with standard-
model explanations of large-scale structure or the high-redshift universe would be
pointless and, in all likelihood, misleading.
One might hope to sidestep this difficulty by comparing the verisimilitude of the
two theories only in some narrow regime where both claim to make predictions; for
instance, the internal kinematics of dwarf galaxies (e.g. Lazutkina (2017)who applies
Niiniluoto’s (1999) measure of truthlikeness to velocity data for a set of dwarfs). But
such a project runs solidly up against an intractable problem.18 Milgrom’s theory
is quite capable of making inter-subjectively testable predictions about galaxies.
The standard cosmological model – due largely to the vagueness of the dark matter
hypothesis – is not; as we have seen, the best it can hope for is to include a scheme for
simulating galaxy evolution that leads to model galaxies that look, in some average
or statistical sense, like real galaxies. But even standard-model cosmologists can
be quite frank about the degree to which their numerical experiments are explicitly
designed to reproduce known facts. For instance, one researcher writes19
Galaxy formation simulations . . . tune parameters such that the simulations produce realistic-
looking galaxy populations. In this sense the sub-grid models are ‘validated’ as ‘realistic’
models by plausibility arguments in comparison to observations. Historically these models
result from trial and error experiments. The models themselves might easily be ‘wrong’ (in
a strict physical sense) or assuming unrealistically high values for the coupling efficiencies
– they still produce realistic galaxy properties and the authors claim success.
The ‘success’ of standard-model cosmologists at explaining observations of galaxies
is a function of a host of factors that are external to their theory: how creative they
were in crafting the “sub-gridmodels”; how effectively theywere able to convince the
larger community (including, most importantly, journal referees and editors) of the
physicality of those models; howmuch time (human and computer) was available for
the simulations and their analysis (and, therefore, how much funding was available);
etc. As Thomas Kuhn might have said, these are tests of the theorist, not of the
theory.
Given the fundamentally different ways in which the two groups of cosmologists
achieve correspondence of their theory with the facts, it is reasonable to ask whether
case studies of methodology might not be a better guide to the progress-toward-truth
of their respective theories than measures of verisimilitude. After all, one need not
have a perfect criterion of justice (say) to know that there are certain methodologies
(e.g. deposition of witnesses) that aremore conducive to achieving justice than others
(e.g. divination). In the sameway, it is hard to believe that a critical, or falsificationist,
17 This difference reflects the enormous disparity in number of scientists working in the two research
programs, as well as the disinclination of government agencies to fund Milgromian researchers,
among other possible factors.
18 The difficulty discussed in this paragraph exists for any criterion of success that is essentially
empirical or instrumentalist, e.g. Carnap’s (1950) ‘qualified instance confirmation,’ Laudan’s (1978)
‘problem-solving efficiency,’ van Fraassen’s (1980) ‘constructive empiricism’ etc.
19 Quoted by Merritt (2020, p. 75) who gives the source. “Sub-grid models” refers to algorithms
that are meant to represent, in some approximate manner, physical processes that occur on scales
of time or space that are far too small to be simulated directly, e.g. turbulence, stellar winds etc.
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approach to theory testing is less likely to lead to true theories than an uncritical,
or verificationist, approach (e. g. Agassi 1959; Popper 1962; Albert 1987; Gadenne
2006).
§§
Niiniluoto (1999, p. 17) speculates about why a scientist would choose to follow
a methodology like Popper’s:
. . . for centuries, theory and practice have already been in a mutual interaction in the field
of scientific inference. Scientists learn to do science through implicit indoctrination and
explicit instruction from their masters, textbooks, and colleagues. So if a case study reveals
that a group of real scientists favours ‘bold hypotheses’ and ‘severe tests’, we may judge that
they, or their teachers, have read Popper.
I am quite certain that Niiniluoto is mistaken here. First of all, he is crediting philoso-
phers with far too much influence. Most scientists – particularly young scientists, but
also the scientists who write the textbooks – are dismissive of philosophy, not to say
contemptuous of it. Scientists have reasons for doing the things they do, of course,
but they don’t get those reasons from the philosophers.
More to the point: Niiniluoto’s explanation would imply that only Milgromian
researchers have been brought up as critical rationalists, while the bulk of cosmolo-
gists have been “indoctrinated” into some other epistemological school (Niiniluoto’s
inductivism, perhaps). And that hypothesis is easily debunked: The number of Mil-
gromian researchers is quite small (perhaps two dozen worldwide, certainly not
many more); I know most of them personally; and I can attest that their educations
were quite of a piece with the educations of the standard-model cosmologists in their
cohorts. There exists no secret society that is indoctrinating selected young scientists
into the Popperian mysteries.20
Here is what does impress a scientist: a bold new conjecture that bears fruit. The
paradigmatic example, one that every physical scientist learns about early in their
education, is the set of postulates from which Bohr derived the energy levels of the
hydrogen atom. Bohr’s success is impressive because it was so improbable. Einstein
(speaking at a time when Popper was eleven years old) declared that “There must
be something behind it. I do not believe that the derivation of the absolute value
of the Rydberg constant is purely fortuitous.”21 And it is obvious to any beginning
student of quantum mechanics that a ‘turn-the-crank’ methodology like abduction
or inference-to-the-best-explanation could not possibly have led Bohr to his bold
conjecture, a conjecture that went far beyond the evidence that motivated it.
I am sure that standard-model cosmologists are just as impressed as other scien-
tists by instances in which a bold hypothesis survives a severe test. But the standard
cosmological model (at least since the addition of dark matter ca. 1980) is simply not
20 Niiniluoto’s “implicit indoctrination” calls to mind Tolstoy’s (1906) invocation of “epidemic
suggestions” to explain the (to him) unfathomable popularity of Shakespeare’s plays.
21 Quoted by Jammer (1966, p. 86). Jammer gives the original German in his note 107 as “da muß
etwas dahinter sein; ich glaube nicht, daß die Rydbergkonstante durch Zufall in absoluten Werten
ausgedrückt richtig herauskommt.”
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suited to making testable predictions, much less bold ones. So standard-model cos-
mologists have, understandably, resigned themselves to the post hoc accommodation
of new data, typically via large-scale computer simulations, and typically only in a
statistical sense. Whereas Milgrom’s bold theory is eminently testable, even using
data from a single galaxy, and (as we have seen) its novel predictions have again and
again survived attempts to refute them. One need look no farther to understand why
Milgromian researchers have stuck with a methodology that aligns with Popper’s.
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